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BULK SALES ACT-WHAT IS A "SALE IN BULK"-Bulk Sales legislation,
nurtured by credit men's associations throughout the country,' was designed to
remedy a specific evil : 2
"Without such a law a retailer who has purchased his stock largely on
credit may sell it for cash, put the proceeds in his pocket and walk off,
leaving the wholesaler from whom it was bought without remedy against it,
the new purchaser having a perfect title." s
However, to eradicate this all too common practice, the legislatures, in defining
what transaction shall constitute a bulk sale within the meaning of a particular
Bulk Sales Act, have employed general terms: "a sale or transfer" I of an entire
stock in bulk,5 or "of a large part",6 "a major part",7 "a major part in value",8
"all or substantially all '9 or "any stock in bulk",' or "any portion not sold or
transferred in the ordinary course of trade and regular and usual prosecution of
the seller's business"." The Arizona statute 12 alone fixes a specific amount: the
'Billig, Bulk Sales Laws (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 72, 81; see MONTGOMERY, LAWS
AND DisioSNS APPLYING TO SALES IN BuLE (1926) 9; CREDIT MANUAL OF COGIMERCIAL
LAWS FOR 1934 (1933) 251.
2 See Kraft Co. v. Heller, 188 Ind. 612, 614, 125 N. E. 209 (1919); Gallus v. Elmer,
193 Mass. io6, 109, 78 N. E. 772, 773 (19o6) ; Patmos v. Grand Rapids Dairy Co., 243 Mich.
417, 420, 220 N. W. 724, 725 (1928) ; West Shoe Co. v. Lemish, 279 Pa. 414, 417, 124 Atl.
87, 88 (1924) ; Billig, supra note I, at 74.
But a creditor may waive his rights: Lietchfield Mfg. Co. v. Heinicke, 200 Iowa 958, 205
N. W. 35o (1925) ; see Marshall v. Leon, 267 Ill. App. 242 (1932). If buyer applies part
of purchase price to payment of creditors, he will be subrogated to their rights. Pratt Paper
Co. v. Eiffier, 196 Iowa 199, 194 N. W. 37o (1923) ; Bay Co. v. Ridnour, 49 S. D. 27, 2o6 N.
W. 463 (1925) ; see Linn Co. Bank v. Davis, 1O3 Kan. 672, 675, 175 Pac. 972, 973 (1918).
'See Schoeppel v. Pfannensteil, 122 Kan. 630, 635, 253 Pac. 567, 569 (927).
' "Sale or transfer" is usually held not to include a chattel mortgage. Aristo Hosiery Co.
Inc. v. Ramsbottam, 46 R. I. 505, 129 Atl. 503 (1925); Krower v. Martin, 184 S. W. 511
(Tex. Cir. App. 1916). Contra: Norton jewelry Co. v. Maddock, 115 Kan. lO8, 222 Pac. 113
(1924) ; Billig, Bulk Sales Laws (1933) 39 W. VA. L. REV. 323, 326. In some states, chattel
mortgages are included by statute. LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1932) § 9037; MICH. CoAI9. LAws
(1929) § 9545; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1917) § 44; cf. ME. REV. STAT. (1930)
C. 123, § 6 (statute does not apply to mortgages made in good faith for purpose of security
only).
'Every Bulk Sales Act makes this provision; for example, see ALA. CODE (Michie,
1928) § 8o41; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Courtright, 1930) § 3077; IDAHO ANN. CODE (1932) § 62-
701; OKLA. STAT. (1931) § 10014,
ICONN. Rxv. STAT. (1930) § 4703; N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp. 193o) § 182-8o; Ky. STAT.
ANN. (Baldwin, 1930) § 2651a-5.
IL.. REV. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 121a, par. I; S. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 6617.
"Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 3127; R. I. GEN. LAws (1923) c. 311.
9 CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 3440 (substantial part) ; D. C. CODE (1929) tit. i1,
§16; FLA. Comp. LAWS (1928) § 5775; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 83, § 21; ONT.
REv. STAT. (927) c. 167, § 6; ORE. CODE ANIN. (193o) § 64-1o4; WASH. Rsv. STAT. (Rem-
ington, 1932) § 5835.
"0GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 3226; IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 8052; IOWA
CODE (1931) § 1008; MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. io6, § I; MICn. Comp. LAWS (1929)
§ 9545; MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, 192i) § 86o7; Nm. Comp. STAT. (1930) § 36-501; 01lo
CODE ANN. (Throckmorton, 1930) § 11102; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon. 1931) tit. 69, § 525;
S. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1932) § 6617; S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 914
n The statutes of almost all states make this provision: for example, see LA. GEN. STAT.
ANN. (Dart, 1932) § 9037; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) C. 123, § 6; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY
LAW (1917) § 44. For classification and construction of these statutes, see MONTGOmERY,
op. cit. supra note I, at 13.
'ARiz. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 2888.
(856)
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transfer of the whole or seventy-five per cent. of a stock of goods is specified by
the statute. Thus, it has generally been left to the courts to determine in each
case whether the sale or transfer is of such magnitude or so unusual as to fall
within the provisions of the statute, with no guide except general concepts and a
clear-cut purpose. Considering this point, one court has stated, "The Bulk Sales
Act is not well drawn." I'
Originally, the Act was to prevent only sales of an entire stock of goods in
bulk, but gradually the legislatures, as can be seen from the terms employed, and
the courts, have included within the Act sales of less than the whole of a stock
of goods. Writing in 1911, Dodge, J., stated in Carpenter V. Karnow: "I
find no case in which the sale of less than an entire stock in trade has been so re-
garded." 14 The scope of this note will be to examine the cases decided under the
various Acts to determine to what extent this statement is true today; to ascertain
what portion of a stock of goods must be transferred so that the courts will regard
the transfer as falling within the purview of the statute.
Naturally, each case must turn on its particular facts, the amount of goods
sold, the amount in stock at time of sale, the merchant's indebtedness, the type
of business and the wording of the particular statute. However, as each court
endeavors to carry out the purpose of the statute-that creditor's rights shall not
be prejudiced by a sale in bulk-the cases present a similarity allowing their con-
sideration as a group without undue emphasis on the particular statute.
Transactions Within the Statute
All courts agree that if a merchant owning two or more businesses, each
conducted separately, sells one, such sale is within the Act; 15 and it has been held
that the sale of a wholesale house used to supply a chain of retail stores, though
the owner continued to operate the retail stores, was a sale in bulk."6  However,
where the owner of a large store with goods valued at $33,000 opened a branch,
all goods being bought and paid for through the main store, and books kept at the
branch only to ascertain if it was being operated at a profit, a sale of the goods in
the branch for $4,ooo, at seventy cents on the dollar, was held not within the Act
as it was not the sale of a separate business.'7 But a sale of $4,ooo from a stock
of $33,000 might well have been considered a sale of a portion outside the ordi-
nary course of business.ls Courts have had no difficulty in holding sales of the
"Webber v. Hall, 54 N. S. R. 192, 202 (1921). For discussion of the general problems
involved in Bulk Sales Acts, see Billig, Bulk Sales Laws (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 3o; (1933)
39 W. VA. L. Q. 322; Driscoll, Sales in Bulk Act (929) 4 WAsr. L. R-v. 97; MONT-
GOmERY, op. cit. supra note I.
1' 193 Fed. 762, 765 (D. Mass. 1911).
Young v. Lemieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 AtI. 436 (19o7) ; Goodman v. Clarkson, 39 Ga.
App. 383, 147 S. E. 183 (1928) ; Ogden Ave. State Bank v. Cheny, 225 Ill. App. 201
(1922) ; Interlake Tissue Mills Co., Ltd. v. Everall Co., Ltd., 500 Ont. L. R. 165 (i21) ;
Gagnon v. La Banque Nationf1e, 29 Que. K. B. 166 (1919) ; see Roberts v. Kaemmerer, 220
Mo. App. 582, 586, 287 S. W. 1057, 1059 (x926) ; cf. Potter v. Walker, 2 F. (2d) 774 (E. D.
N. Y. 1924) ; Bank of Montreal v. Ideal Knitting Mills, Ltd., 55 Ont. L. R. 410 (1924).
" Keller v. Fowler Bros., 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S. W. 879 (923).
7In i-re John Allan, Ltd., 8 Can. B. R. 97 (1926).
28 A merchant's "ordinary course of business" is determined by the nature of his business,
the amount of sales he usually makes, and the amount of his indebtedness. Hart v. Brierly,
189 Mass. 598, 76 N. E. 286 (1915). And whether the merchant is regarded by the trade as a
wholesaler or retailer: Webber v. Hall, supra note 13. But not by whether such transactions
are usual in the general conduct of the type of business throughout the community. Rison
v. Knapp, 2o Fed. Cas. 835, No. i861 (E. D. Ark. 1868). Apparently, a seller can gain a
new course of business without notice to creditors: see Vacuum Oil Co. v. Wichita Inde-
pendent Consolidated Co., i1O Kan. 245, 203 Pac. 915 (1922) (gained new course of trade
but did not follow it) ; Feldstein v. Fusco, 238 N. Y. 58, 143 N. E. 790 (I924). But a seller
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entire business in two or more transactions as within both the letter and purpose
of the Act.19
The statute includes a sale of $13o,ooo worth of goods from a stock of
$14o,ooo, 20 and a sale of eighty per cent. of the merchant's goods.2 The smallest
transactions to which it has been held the statute applied were a sale of one-third
of a stock of goods 22 and a sale of from one-fourth to one-seventh of the entire
stock.' Webber v. Hall2 4 illustrates the attitude of the courts: a retail shoe
merchant with stock valued between $20,ooo and $3oooo with an indebtedness
of $33,ooo, being hard pressed by his creditors, sold shoes in lots of $IOO, $200
and $50o at less than cost, until $7,000 worth of his goods had been sold. The
court held the Act applied, since these were sales "out of the ordinary course of
trade". It would not seem that the sale of $IOO worth of shoes should be con-
sidered outside the ordinary course of trade of a retailer, but if such sales were
made in quick succession and the stock not replenished, the Act should apply.
The courts have allowed creditors to attack a transaction whereby goods 25
were transferred for goods on the theory that a sale is any transfer of goods for
a consideration, whether for cash or other property. If goods are placed in a
store under an agreement that if they are not paid for within a certain time, the
seller may retake a stock of goods of equal value, the statute should apply on
the retaking of the goods in favor of all creditors who became creditors
while the goods were in the store. However, if the seller gets a, fair price for
the goods sold, and receives other goods in return, the ability of creditors to
realize on their claims is not impaired and the formalities of the statute should
not be required as a prerequisite to a valid sale.
There is a division of authority on the question of whether a sale of a part-
ner's interest 21 in a retail business falls within the statute. If the sale is for the
purpose of taking in a new partner, by the weight of authority the sale is void
may not cease business and then sell his goods without complying with the statute: Hoja v.
Motoc, 23 Mich. 258, 209 N. W. 66 (1926); Teich v. McAuley, 212 S. W. 979 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919).
Hall v. Main, 34 F. (2d) 528 (E. D. Ill. 1929) ; Conquest v. Athins, 123 Me. 327, 122
Atl. 858 (1923) ; Thorndike & Hix Lobster Co. v. Hall, 223 App. Div. 576, 229 N. Y. Supp.
225 (1928) ; Kirkholder & Rausch Co. v. Bridgland, 12o Misc. 565, iig N. Y. Supp. 113
(1923) ; see Webber v. Hall, supra note 13 (twenty or thirty sales) ; cf. Hughes-Curry Pack-
ing Co. v. Sprague, 2o0 Ind. 540, 165 N. E. 318 (929).
' Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S. W. 26 (1926).
' Commercial Motor Bodies and Carriages, Ltd. v. Perth, Ltd., 65 Ont. L. R. 383 (1930).
Webber v. Hall, supra note 13.
See Norton-Berger Shoe Co. v. Rideau, i La. App. 244, 245 (924).
" Supra note 13.
'As to creditors, the statute applies to all, personal and business. People's Sav-
ings Bank v. Van Allsburg, 165 Mich. 524, 131 N. W. ioi (1911) ; Roberts v. Kaemmerer,
supra note 15 (creditors of goods for store A may attack sale of store B in bulk);
Douglas Fir Lumber Co. v. Star Lumbev Co., 27 N. M. 403, 201 Pac. 867 (ig2i); Hartwig
v. Rushing, 93 Ore. 6, 182 Pac. 177 (igig) ; see Fitzhugh v. Munnell, 92 Ore. 47, 179 Pac.
679 (1919) (creditors whose claims are due and will become due) ; cf. Ellis Jones Drug Co.
v. Coker, 151 Miss. O2, 117 So. 545 (1928) (individual creditor of a partner need not be
notified on sale of the partnership). But not to tort claims. Superior Plating Works v. Art
Metal Crafts Co., 218 Ill. App. 148 (192o) ; Harrison v. Riddell, 64 Mont. 466, 2IO Pac. 46o
(1922). But must have been creditor at time o~f sale. Lawndale Sash Co. v. West Side Trust
& Savings Bank, 207 Ill. App. 3 (1917) ; see Trummer v. Crimmins, 262 Mich. 314, 247 N.
W. 191 (1933).
d Intangible property, with the exception of a partner's interest, has not been considered
as within the Act. Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Ill. App. 588 (1933) (assets
of a bank) ; Thorndike & Hix Lobster Co. v. Hall, supra note ig (good will) ; (1933) I U.
o, CxicAGo L. Rxv. 343.
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unless the statutory formalities are complied with; 27 but if the transfer is of one
partner's interest to one of the other partners, the statute does not apply." Are
these decisions in accord with the purpose of the statute, disregarding abstract
considerations of whether the transfer of rights in a partnership is a "sale of a
stock of goods" or only the transfer of an interest? 29 Where X, the sole owner
of a business, sells a half interest in the business to Y to admit him as a partner,
if the consideration paid by Y consists of goods contributed to the business, X's
creditors are not adversely affected, for X's interest in that stock of goods has not
been altered and hence the statute should not apply.
0 However, if the consider-
ation which Y contributes is cash, X can pocket the cash and keep it out of reach
of creditors, and as X's interest in that stock of goods is now diminished, the
security of his creditors is diminished. To this latter situation the Act might
readily be applied.
In the case in which an existing partner transfers his interest to one of his
partners, the courts have rightly held that the Act has no application.
31 Here the
effect of the transaction on creditors is that partnership creditors will be deprived
of their preference over the personal creditors of the remaining partners in the
partnership assets and the personal creditors of the withdrawing partners will
lose all interest in these goods. As for the latter, a statute passed to proted
creditors of merchants who became creditors only because the debtor was a
merchant would not seem to include them. Nor, with respect to the former,
should a statute passed to end the evil of "fly-by-night" merchants be extended to
preserve a mere preference among creditors in certain assets.
Transactions to Which the Statite Did Not Apply
Transactions to which the courts have held the statute did not apply have
been of small size and value: "It should be something more than that [ten per
cent.] or nearer a half of the stock to come under condemnation 
of the statute." 32
'Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Bouchelle, 12 Ga. App. 661, 78 S. E. 51 (913);
Daly v. Sumpter Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155 S. W. 167 (1912) ; Watkins v. Angus, 241
Mich. 69o, 217 N. W. 894 (1928) ; Ellis Jones Drug Co. v. Coker, supra note 25. Contra:
Yancey v. Lanar-Rankin Drug Co., 14o Ga. 359, 78 S. E. 1O78 (913).
' Taylor v. Folds, 2 Ga. App. 453, 58 S. E. 683 (1907) ; Schoeppel v. Pfannensteil, supra
note 3; Fairfield Shoe Co. v. Olds, 176 Ind. 526, 96 N. E. 592 (1911) ; Peterson Co. v. Free-
burn, 2o4 Iowa 644, 225 'N. W. 746 (927) ; In re Rosenberg's Account, i6 Dist. & C. 569
(Pa. 1931) ; cf. Dakota Trust & Savings Bank v. Hanson, 5 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925). Contra: Howell v. Howell, 142 Tenn. 31, 215 S. W. 278 (2929) ("A half 
interest is
a portion of the stock").
' Where the statute provides for a "sale or transfer of any interest", a transfer by one
partner of his right in the partnership to a stranger or one of the partners would be 
within
the Act. Spokane Merchants' Ass'n v. Koska, 228 Wash. 445, 203 Pac. 969 (1922). As to a
transfer to a corporation formed to take over the business, the cases are in conflict; 
that such
a transaction is within the statute: First Nat. Bank of Durham v. Raleigh Savings Bank, 37
F. (2d) 301 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) ; Keedy v. Sterling Electric Appliance Co., 13 Del. Ch. 
66,
115 Atl. 359 (2921) ; Sakelos v. Hutchinson Bros., 129 Md. 3oo, g Atl. 
357 (igi6) ; Smith-
Calhoun Rubber Co. v. McOhie Rubber Co., 235 S. W. 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); 
see
Lowendahl v. Van Bokkelen, 139 Misc. 857, 248 N. Y. Supp. 553 (931). Contra: 
McLean
v. Miller Robinson Co., 55 F. (2d) 232 (E. D. Pa. 193) ; Maskell v. Alexander, 
ioo Wash.
16, 170 Pac. 350 (ii8) ; Note (2932) 41 YALE L. 3. 1246; (1922) 20 MICH. L. REy. 
9og.
' In one case, both types o f sale were involved. X, a merchant, sold a half-interest 
in
his business to Y, admitting him as a partner, and, shortly thereafter, sold 
his remaining in-
terest to Y, leaving Y as sole owner. The court held the latter sale to be 
void. In deciding
as it did, the court was undoubtedly influenced by the fact' that X had here, 
in effect, sold
out completely to Y, and that the admission of Y as a partner had been 
merely a device to
evade the statute. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Bouchelle, spra note 27.
1Denton v. White, 223 Ky. 640, 4 S. W. (2d) 412 (1928) ; Hartwig v. Rushing, 
supra
note 34; McCallum v. Jones, 15o Tenn. 492, 265 S. W. 984 (1924).
' Armfield Co. v. Saleeby, 178 N. C. 298, 301, ioo S. E. 611 (2929) ; see Splain 
v. Good-
rich Rubber Co., 53 App. D. C. 303, 29o Fed. 275 (1923).
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Similarly the statute does not apply to sales of $1,o9o and $487 out of a stock
with a value between $6,000 and $2o,ooo 3  In Krueger v. Hanzmond,3
4 X sold
four tubes and eight casings, his total stock of goods for the repair of cars, in
one sale. The court held this sale was not within the Act as the articles were so
few in number and of such small value that the sale could not be regarded as
within the spirit or reason of the law, though actually a sale in bulk. Nor, where
a merchant ran a retail piano store and music house, did the statute condemn a
sale of all the sheet music department, constituting five to seven per cent. of the
total business, as this was not a sale of "all or substantially all".
35 A sale of an
entire accessory business run as part of a repair shop or other non-commercial
business, is not within the Act.3 6 Likewise, a sale of an auto sales agency and
$39.24 worth of accessories out of a stock of $1,5oo, where both businesses had
previously been operated as one, was not a bulk sale as to the accessories because
it was not of a "material portion" of the stock.' One Illinois case has held that
the sale by a dairyman of the goods remaining after a sale of his cattle and
wagons did not come within the Act.38 Nor has the Act been used to prevent
the sale in bulk of odds and ends of goods when moving the store to a new loca-
tion, nor of old or shopworn goods, where the principal business is not that of
dealing in such goods.3 9
Thus a review of the cases presents no settled construction of the Act as to
the amount necessary to be sold so that the sale is a bulk sale; a sale of half or
more than half would probably be held within the statute, less than one-fourth
probably not. The cases do little more than present guides or concepts which
the courts will apply to a set of facts, but provide no easily applicable test by
which a merchant can ascertain if his sale is a bulk sale. Two questions remain:
What is the effect of weighing, counting, or measuring as contrasted with a sale
in a lump quantity, and what is the effect of solvency or insolvency of the mer-
chant in the application of the statute to a sale of less than the entire stock?
A lower New York court has said:
"A sale in bulk is made where separating, counting, measuring, weighing
or dividing in parcels, packages or barrels does not take place but where the
mass and heap are sold as one . Concededly, a purchaser might buy
a large part of one's stock of goods by selecting a certain number of one
article and a definite amount of another and not be said to have made a bulk
or mass sale." "
However, to give effect to the legislative intent and purpose, a sale large enough
to prejudice rights of creditors should not be held within the purview of the Act
merely because the goods sold were counted.
In deciding cases under legislation of this type, the courts have not put
sufficient emphasis on the ability of the merchant to pay his creditors, or the
Fudge v. Brown, 126 Wash. 475, 218 Pac. 251 (1923). See also Nisbet v. Quinn, 7 Fed.
76o (C. C. Ga. 1881) (sales of $1200, $1900, $2200, from stock of $9o0o were out of ordi-
nary course of trade) ; Sabin v. Horenstein, 26o Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919)- (sales in job
lots).
4123 Kan. 319, 255 Pac. 30 (1927).
Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204, 213 Pac. 929 (923).
Fisk Rubber Co. v. Harson Auto Co., 168 Ark. 418, 270 S. W. 605 (925) ; Wellston
Radio Corp. v. Culberson, 175 Ark. 921, 300 S. W. 443 (1927) ; Goff Co. v. First State Bank,
175 Ark. 158, 298 S. W. 884 (1927).
7 Fiske Rubber Co. v. Hayes, 131 Ark. 248, 199 S. W. 96 (1917).
Larson v Judd, 200 Ill. App. 420 (916) ; cf. Hall v. Main, supra note 19.
Fiske Rubber Co. v. Hayes, supra note 37; see Lusby v. Sachs, 184 Ark. 929, 44 S. W.
(2d) 348 (931) ; Webber v. Hall, supra note 13. Contra: Cohen v. Calhoun, 15o So. 198
(Miss. 1933).
0 Feldstein v. Fusco, 205 App. Div. 8o6, 2Ol N. Y. Supp. 4 (923), rev'd, 238 N. Y. 58,
143 N. E. 790 (I924), but this statement was not questioned.
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relation between the amount of goods remaining after the sale and the amount
of the merchant's indebtedness. Indeed, there are statements and holdings that
the solvency or insolvency of the seller is immaterial.41 One case goes to the
extent of applying the Act even though the court admits that the creditor's posi-
tion was improved by the transaction.42 Whatever may have been the tacit con-
sideration given this factor-and in the majority of the cases the seller is insol-
vent at the time of sale-the opinions of the courts usually do not weigh it in
relation to the size of the sale and the amount of goods remaining. To give
effect to the legislative intent, the solvency or insolvency of the seller should be
of primary importance.
With this confusing and undesirable state of the law, an honest merchant
about to make a sale slightly larger than is usual for him cannot tell whether the
statutory formalities such as notice to creditors and publication, should be com-
plied with; nor can the buyer. Often it would be inconvenient for both seller
and buyer to wait five or seven days after giving notice to creditors, especially
where the seller is solvent, and the buyer and seller will benefit only by a sale at
once; and for the courts to require this would unduly hamper the business of
buying and selling. Considering the general concepts applied by the courts, the
size of the sale, the amount of the sales usually made by this merchant, amount
of stock remaining after the sale, and the solvency or insolvency of the creditor,
always attempting to give effect to the legislative intent, can some rule, supported
by the majority of the cases, be formulated to solve this problem? 43  Can rules
be postulated that will adjust the basic conflict between facility of sale and rapid
turnover, so necessary to retailers, and the rights of creditors to look to these
goods for payment without the danger that they will suddenly and silently be put
beyond their reach? It would seem basic, to give effect to the purpose of legis-
lation of this type that unless the sale of less than an entire stock of goods in
fact prejudiced rights of creditors, the Act should not apply. But even if they
are prejudiced, a sale of one-fourth of the entire stock, unless such sale was part
of a general scheme to sell the entire stock of goods, should not be regarded as
within the Act for two reasons: (i) merchants should be allowed freedom
quickly to make a good bargain of at least that part of their wares; (2) it must
be remembered, the Act is in derogation of the common law right to dispose of
property as one pleases. 44 For a sale of more than one-fourth the goods, if the
amount of the merchant's indebtedness either is slightly less than or exceeds the
value of the goods remaining after the sale, the sale should be held within the
Act. However, if the value of the goods remaining greatly exceeds the mer-
chant's indebtedness, such a sale should not require compliance with the statutory
formalities. Most of the cases reviewed in the foregoing would bear out this
analysis, but a clear adoption of such rules by the courts or the legislatures would
go far to enable a merchant, or buyer, to know if his particular transaction was
within the Act. K.W.G.
' Sabin v. Horenstein, supra note 33 (the court rejected counsel's argument that sale
must be of an entire stock of goods "or such proportion of it as will render the vendor less
able to pay his obligations") ; Miller v. Myers, 300 Pa. 192, 150 AtI. 588 (1930) ; Glantz v.
Gardiner, 40 R. I. 297, 1oo Atl. 913 (1917).
, Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386 (1917).
4 "If the sale is one which naturally divests the vendor of the controlling interest, or in
any other way alienates his right, title and interest to the extent that the creditors are jeopar-
dized, it would appear that the court would hold it to be a substantial part of 
the goods
rather than to require the act to be one which disposes of 'practically all' of the stock 
of
goods, wares or merchandise." Driscoll, supra note 13, at 107.
"Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 5,1, 512, 66 S. E. 257 (i9o9) ; Fairfield Shoe Co. v.
Olds, supra note 28, at 529, 96 N. E. at 593; Blanchard Co. v. Ward, supra note '35, 
at 2o7,
"213 Pac. at 930; cf. Peterson Co. v. Freeburn, 2o4 Iowa 644, 2,5 N. W. 746 (1927).
